Document Type : Original Article
Highlights
Extended abstract
This comprehensive study explores the moral axioms as interpreted through the philosophy of ethics by Imam Khomeini, emphasizing the epistemological dimensions of ethical judgments. Khomeini frames ethics as not merely a theoretical understanding of virtues and vices but as an essential practice intended for the cultivation of the soul. This paper discusses the foundations of ethical philosophy, particularly the role of self-evident moral principles, and underscores their significance in rational justification of ethical propositions.
Khomeini’s conception of morality involves understanding its essence through the cultivation of virtues, which involves deep introspection, moral training, and developing a disposition towards right actions. He states that ethics is a state of the soul that incites action and is achievable through self-discipline, contemplation, and habitual practice. For Khomeini, moral propositions such as "justice is good," "oppression is bad," and "lying is bad" are self-evident recognized and resonate with human nature. According to him, these self-evident propositions are categories where the meanings of goodness and badness intrinsically exist, reflective of a logical necessity inherent to the propositions themselves.
Imam Khomeini categorizes ethical topics into different groups based on their relation to inherent moral qualities, stating that some moral propositions are inherently good or bad, while others derive their moral implications from context or consequences. He suggests that some ethical propositions – particularly those falling under clear axioms – align with the human heart and consciousness, which forms the basis for moral reasoning.
Imam Khomeini emphasizes that moral prerequisites must involve understanding rational axioms concerning human existence and appropriate conduct. He asserts that innate moral discernments are evident in certain axioms and demonstrates this through examples, positing that certain actions such as kindness and justice arise from innate tendencies towards goodness. Moreover, the emphasis on rational justification correlates ethical concepts with broader metaphysical frameworks that include divine will and human responsibility. The philosophy elaborated by Imam Khomeini also includes discussions on the epistemological foundations of ethical judgments, emphasizing the need for rational justification of moral statements.
Despite the merits of Khomeini's approach, several ambiguities remain, particularly regarding the practical applications of ethical theories in everyday life. The distinction between analytical and synthetic ethical propositions remains contentious, suggesting that interpretations of moral laws may differ based on individual perception and societal norms. It seem posits that some axiomatic moral principles cannot establish connections with external realities but function instead as a priori truths within the moral framework. This realization raises important questions regarding the relational dynamics between moral axioms and their real-world applications.
In more detail, if we want to present an analysis of moral justification, we must have the following statement: the axioms presented are analytical, and the analytical proposition is a true and conditional proposition, and the conditional proposition does not prove the existence of an external reality. In other words, everyone says: observing justice is obligatory and one should not oppress anyone, and there is no disagreement or ambiguity in the essence of this proposition. What is disputed and ambiguous is determining the instances of justice and injustice; such as the fact that a woman's inheritance is half of a man's inheritance, is it justice or injustice? Moral sentences are not mental reflections of present knowledge to be considered part of conscience; therefore, moral sentences need reasoning to justify and prove having an external reality. For example, reasoning to prove the necessity of a moral act can be obtained as follows:
A certain moral act is the cause of achieving the perfection of true free will. (Sughri: First Introduction)
For the realization of the effect, the existence of a cause is necessary (the principle of causality). (Kubra: Second Premise)
So [to achieve the perfection of true free will,] the existence of such and such a moral act is necessary. (Conclusion)
The first premise requires proof and is proven based on non-moral self-evident propositions. Because this proposition states the causality of an action for achieving the perfection of true free will, and recognizing that an action is an instance of “a necessary cause for achieving the perfection of true free will” requires proof, just as recognizing the instance of true free will perfection also requires proof. Kubra’s proposition is also the first non-moral self-evident. Therefore, to justify the necessity of a moral act, at least two arguments are needed:
1. Proof and recognition of the instance of true free will perfection, which is the ultimate perfection of man, nearness to God.
2. Proof of the first premise, which is proven through non-moral self-evident propositions, i.e. by theoretical reason or experience or revelation.
According to the validity of the distinction between theoretical and practical reason, the above arguments are considered to be the perceptions of theoretical reason, and for this reason, all moral propositions are referred to theoretical reason.
The conclusion drawn from Khomeini’s teachings revolves around the idea that ethical truths constitute a foundational aspect of human existence and must be intertwined with the overarching themes of spirituality and divine purpose. His exploration of moral axioms invites further scholarly investigation to elucidate the nature of ethical reasoning and the pursuit of knowledge that carries both metaphysical and practical significance for human actions.
Imam Khomeini views the inherent badness of lying as essential; however, when evaluated in context, it may not always be deemed intrinsically bad, especially if it serves a beneficial purpose, such as concealing secrets from an enemy. He differentiates between general and specific lying, stating that while the former is inherently wrong, the latter can be justified based on its outcomes. Khomeini's framework suggests that the moral judgment of lying depends on its consequences, aligning value assessments with potential benefits or harms, indicating that lying can sometimes align with human nature's pursuit of moral goals
Subjects
